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UN-IRAN
Security Council tightens restrictions on Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities
Full text of the draft resolution


Published 4 March 2008

It increases vigilance over Iranian banks, has states inspect cargo.

Adopting Resolution 1803 by 14-0-1, Council Welcomes Agreement between Iran, Atomic Energy Agency to Resolve Outstanding Issues on Iran’s Nuclear Programme.

The Security Council today approved a new round of sanctions against Iran for refusing to suspend uranium enrichment and heavy-water-related projects, as had been required in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007), and for taking issue with the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) right to verify design information provided to it.


3 March 2008 - SC/9268 *
Department of Public Information * News and Media Division * New York * Security Council

5848th Meeting (PM)

Adopting resolution 1803 (2008) by a vote of 14 in favour to none
against, with 1 abstention (Indonesia), the Council, acting under
Article 41 of Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter [regarding
binding measures not involving armed force], the Council affirmed its
earlier decision that Iran should, without delay, suspend the
aforementioned activities, as required in paragraph 2 of resolution
1737 (Press Release SC/8928 of 23 December 2006).

The Council called upon all States to exercise "vigilance and
restraint" regarding entry into or transit through their territories
of individuals engaged in or providing support for Iran’s
proliferation-sensitive nuclear activities or for the development of
nuclear-weapon delivery systems.

In that connection, it decided that all States should notify the
Committee established pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737
(2007) of such entry or transit, specifically of those people
mentioned in the annex to resolution 1737, annex I to resolution 1747
(Press Release SC/8980 of 24 March 2007), or annex I and annex II
(regarding procurement of prohibited items) of the current
resolution, as well of additional persons so designated by the
Council or the Committee.

The Council further extended the freezing of the financial assets
of persons or entities supporting its proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems,
including those mentioned in annexes I and II of the current
resolution or designated by the Committee.

It called upon all States to exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all
banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank
Saderat.

The Council also continued the blocking of the import and export
of sensitive nuclear material and equipment, except when meant
exclusively for use in light-water reactors with advance notice to
the Committee.

States were also called upon to inspect cargo to and from Iran of
aircraft and vessels owned or operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic
Republic of Iran Shipping Line, provided "reasonable grounds" existed
to believe that the aircraft or vessel was transporting prohibited
goods.

The Council welcomed the agreement between Iran and IAEA to
resolve all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme,
and progress made in that regard, as set out in the Director
General’s report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4). In that context,
it stressed the willingness of China, France, Germany, Russian
=46ederation, United Kingdom and United States to enhance diplomatic
efforts to promote resumption of dialogue with Iran, with a view to
seeking long-term solution of the issue that would allow for wider
cooperation and, inter alia, the start of direct talks.

The Council would suspend the sanctions if and for so long as
Iran would suspend all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, as verified by IAEA,
but warned that, in the event Iran did not comply with relevant
Council resolutions, it would decide on the adoption of further
appropriate measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII.

At the outset of the meeting, Iran’s representative said:
"Today’s action of some members of the Security Council against
Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along with the measures taken in
this regard in the past, do not meet the minimum standards of
legitimacy and legality." Iran’s nuclear programme had been and
would remain absolutely peaceful and in no way posed any threat to
international peace and security. It, therefore, did not fall within
the Council’s purview. The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear
programme had been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the
past several years.

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past
activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present
activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous
monitoring of the Agency, the country had removed any so-called
"concerns" or "ambiguities" with regard to its peaceful nuclear
activities in the past and at present, he said.

He said the Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility
and integrity of the Agency would only serve the interests of those
who preferred to ignore IAEA, such as the Israeli regime, which, with
hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most
serious threat to international and regional peace and security. The
future security of the world depended on how the United Nations, and
especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and impartial
manner. In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost their
trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of
political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own
agendas.

Although most Council members said they had voted in favour of
the resolution because of Iran’s non-compliance with Council demands,
as well as the IAEA stance that it could not guarantee that Iran’s
nuclear programme was for peaceful purposes only, Indonesia’s
representative, explaining his abstention, said: "Essentially, we are
not convinced whether more sanctions, however incremental, well
targeted and reversible, would move us forward in resolving the
question of Iran’s nuclear programme." Conditions today were
different than at the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007). Iran was
cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture, more sanctions
were not the best course.

The representative of the United Kingdom read a statement agreed
by the Foreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian
=46ederation, United Kingdom and United States, with support of the
High Representative of the European Union, saying that today’s
Council action reflected the international community’s ongoing
serious concerns about the proliferation risks of the Iranian nuclear
programme. "We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its
United Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy
Agency Board requirements, in particular by expanding its
enrichment-related activities."

Calling upon Iran to heed the requirements of the Council and the
Agency, including the suspension of enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities, he said that the group of countries remained
committed to an early negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear
issue, and reaffirmed their commitment to a dual-track approach.
Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006 offered "substantial
opportunities" for political, security and economic benefits to Iran
and the region. He urged Iran to take the opportunity to find a
negotiated way forward.

The representative of the United States added that the
international community had good reason to be concerned about Iran’s
activities, as the present regime, armed with nuclear weapons, would
pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world. Iran
had been funding and supporting terrorists and militants in Lebanon,
the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and Afghanistan. The President of
Iran had embraced the objective of destroying a Member State of the
United Nations. The ministerial statement showed a commitment to a
diplomatic solution. "It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have
to pass another sanctions resolution. But our vote today
demonstrates that the Council will act when countries violate their
international obligations," he said.

The representatives of South Africa, Libya, Viet Nam, France,
China, Costa Rica, Burkina Faso, Belgium, Panama, Croatia and the
Russian Federation also made statements.

The meeting was called to order at 12:45 p.m. and adjourned at 2:55 p.m=
=2E

Background

The Security Council met this afternoon to take action on a draft
resolution regarding non-proliferation contained in document
S/2008/141, sponsored by France, Germany and the United Kingdom.

It also had before it a letter dated 22 February from the
Permanent Representative of Iran addressed to the Secretary-General
and the Council President (document S/2008/116). In it, the
Ambassador writes that the latest report of International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General of 22 February (GOV/2008/4)
declares the full implementation of the work plan concluded between
Iran and IAEA in August 2007 (INFCIRC/711) and, thus, resolution and
closure of all outstanding issues. The Director General had stressed
that "the Agency has been able to conclude that answers provided by
Iran, in accordance with the work plan, are consistent with its
findings" and "considers those questions no longer outstanding". The
report also clearly attests to the "exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear programme", both in the past and at present.

He writes that the consideration of Iran’s peaceful nuclear
programme was imposed on the Council by certain countries out of
"mere political motivations and narrow national interests and on the
basis of certain pretexts and allegations, which have been totally
baseless". The full implementation of the work plan has eliminated
those pretexts and allegations. The current and other reports show
that Iran is committed to its international obligations and, at the
same time, persistent in pursuing and exercising its legal and
inalienable rights.

He further states in his letter that, according to the IAEA
report, the Agency had recently received from Iran additional
information similar to that which Iran had previously provided,
pursuant to the Additional Protocol to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), as well as updated design
information. Iran had provided the Agency with access to declared
nuclear material and had provided relevant reports. It had also
provided access to individuals in response to the Agency’s requests.

It had now become clear, says Iran’s Permanent Representative,
that the country’s peaceful nuclear issue should be dealt with by the
Agency as the sole pertinent international organization and that
safeguards implementation in Iran had to be "in a routine manner from
now on". Further, "the Security Council should avoid inflicting more
damage to the credibility and authority of IAEA, as well as its own
credibility, by persisting in further illegal and illogical
engagement and actions pursued by few countries," he writes.

Draft Resolution

The full text of the draft resolution (document S/2008/141) reads as follows:

"The Security Council,

"Recalling the statement of its President, S/PRST/2006/15, of 29
March 2006, and its resolution 1696 (2006) of 31 July 2006, its
resolution 1737 (2006) of 23 December 2006 and its resolution 1747
(2007) of 24 March 2007, and reaffirming their provisions,

"Reaffirming its commitment to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the need for all States Party
to that Treaty to comply fully with all their obligations, and
recalling the right of States Party, in conformity with Articles I
and II of that Treaty, to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination,

"Recalling the resolution of the IAEA Board of Governors
(GOV/2006/14), which states that a solution to the Iranian nuclear
issue would contribute to global non-proliferation efforts and to
realizing the objective of a Middle East free of weapons of mass
destruction, including their means of delivery,

"Noting with serious concern that, as confirmed by the reports of
23 May 2007 (GOV/2007/22), 30 August 2007 (GOV/2007/48), 15 November
2007 (GOV/2007/48) and 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4) of the Director
General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has
not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment
related and reprocessing activities and heavy-water-related projects
as set out in resolution 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) nor
resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol,
nor taken the other steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors,
nor complied with the provisions of Security Council resolution 1696
(2006), 1737 (2006) and 1747 (2007) and which are essential to build
confidence, and deploring Iran’s refusal to take these steps,

"Noting with concern that Iran has taken issue with the IAEA’s
right to verify design information which had been provided by Iran
pursuant to the modified Code 3.1, emphasizing that in accordance
with Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards Agreement Code 3.1 cannot be
modified nor suspended unilaterally and that the Agency’s right to
verify design information provided to it is a continuing right, which
is not dependent on the stage of construction of, or the presence of
nuclear material at, a facility,

"Reiterating its determination to reinforce the authority of the
IAEA, strongly supporting the role of the IAEA Board of Governors,
commending the IAEA for its efforts to resolve outstanding issues
relating to Iran’s nuclear programme in the work plan between the
Secretariat of the IAEA and Iran (GOV/2007/48, Attachment), welcoming
the progress in implementation of this work plan as reflected in the
IAEA Director General’s report of 15 November 2007 (GOV/2007/58), and
22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), underlining the importance of Iran
producing tangible results rapidly and effectively by completing
implementation of this work plan including by providing answers to
all the questions the IAEA asks so that the Agency, through the
implementation of the required transparency measures, can assess the
completeness and correctness of Iran’s declaration,

"Expressing the conviction that the suspension set out in
paragraph 2 of resolution 1737 (2006) as well as full, verified
Iranian compliance with the requirements set out by the IAEA Board of
Governors would contribute to a diplomatic, negotiated solution, that
guarantees Iran’s nuclear programme is for exclusively peaceful
purposes,

"Stressing that China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation,
the United Kingdom and the United States are willing to take further
concrete measures on exploring an overall strategy of resolving the
Iranian nuclear issue through negotiation on the basis of their June
2006 proposals (S/2006/521), and noting the confirmation by these
countries that once the confidence of the international community in
the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme is
restored it will be treated in the same manner as that of any
Non-Nuclear Weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons,

"Having regard to States’ rights and obligations relating to
international trade,

"Welcoming the guidance issued by the Financial Actions Task
=46orce (FATF) to assist States in implementing their financial
obligations under resolution 1737 (2006),

"Determined to give effect to its decisions by adopting
appropriate measures to persuade Iran to comply with resolution 1696
(2006), resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and with the
requirements of the IAEA, and also to constrain Iran’s development of
sensitive technologies in support of its nuclear and missile
programmes, until such time as the Security Council determines that
the objectives of these resolutions have been met,

"Concerned by the proliferation risks presented by the Iranian
nuclear programme and, in this context, by Iran’s continuing failure
to meet the requirements of the IAEA Board of Governors and to comply
with the provisions of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737
(2006) and 1747 (2007), mindful of its primary responsibility under
the Charter of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security,

"Acting under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the
United Nations,

"1. Reaffirms that Iran shall without further delay take the
steps required by the IAEA Board of Governors in its resolution
GOV/2006/14, which are essential to build confidence in the
exclusively peaceful purpose of its nuclear programme and to resolve
outstanding questions, and, in this context, affirms its decision
that Iran shall without delay take the steps required in paragraph 2
of resolution 1737 (2006), and underlines that the IAEA has sought
confirmation that Iran will apply Code 3.1 modified;

"2. Welcomes the agreement between Iran and the IAEA to resolve
all outstanding issues concerning Iran’s nuclear programme and
progress made in this regard as set out in the Director General’s
report of 22 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4), encourages the IAEA to
continue its work to clarify all outstanding issues, stresses that
this would help to re-establish international confidence in the
exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and supports
the IAEA in strengthening its safeguards on Iran’s nuclear activities
in accordance with the Safeguards Agreement between Iran and the IAEA;

"3. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance and restraint
regarding the entry into or transit through their territories of
individuals who are engaged in, directly associated with or providing
support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, and decides in
this regard that all States shall notify the Committee established
pursuant to paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) (herein "the
Committee") of the entry into or transit through their territories of
the persons designated in the Annex to resolution 1737 (2006), Annex
I to resolution 1747 (2007) or Annex I to this resolution, as well as
of additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing
support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through
the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods,
equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the
measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except
where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the
items in subparagraphs 3(b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006);

"4. Underlines that nothing in paragraph 3 above requires a
State to refuse its own nationals entry into its territory, and that
all States shall, in the implementation of the above paragraph, take
into account humanitarian considerations, including religious
obligations, as well as the necessity to meet the objectives of this
resolution, resolution 1737 (2006) and resolution 1747 (2007),
including where Article XV of the IAEA Statute is engaged;

"5. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures
to prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of
individuals designated in Annex II to this resolution as well as of
additional persons designated by the Security Council or the
Committee as being engaged in, directly associated with or providing
support for Iran’s proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or for
the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems, including through
the involvement in procurement of the prohibited items, goods,
equipment, materials and technology specified by and under the
measures in paragraphs 3 and 4 of resolution 1737 (2006), except
where such entry or transit is for activities directly related to the
items in subparagraphs 3 (b) (i) and (ii) of resolution 1737 (2006)
and provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige a State to
refuse its own nationals entry into its territory;

"6. Decides that the measures imposed by paragraph 5 above
shall not apply where the Committee determines on a case-by-case
basis that such travel is justified on the grounds of humanitarian
need, including religious obligations, or where the Committee
concludes that an exemption would otherwise further the objectives of
the present resolution;

"7. Decides that the measures specified in paragraphs 12, 13,
14 and 15 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall apply also to the persons
and entities listed in Annexes I and III to this resolution, and any
persons or entities acting on their behalf or at their direction, and
to entities owned or controlled by them and to persons and entities
determined by the Council or the Committee to have assisted
designated persons or entities in evading sanctions of, or in
violating the provisions of, this resolution, resolution 1737 (2006)
or resolution 1747 (2007);

"8. Decides that all States shall take the necessary measures
to prevent the supply, sale or transfer directly or indirectly from
their territories or by their nationals or using their flag vessels
or aircraft to, or for use in or benefit of, Iran, and whether or not
originating in their territories, of:

(a) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set
out in INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part2 of document S/2006/814, except the
supply, sale or transfer, in accordance with the requirements of
paragraph 5 of resolution 1737 (2006), of items, materials,
equipment, goods and technology set out in sections 1 and 2 of the
Annex to that document, and sections 3 to 6 as notified in advance to
the Committee, only when for exclusive use in light water reactors,
and where such supply, sale or transfer is necessary for technical
cooperation provided to Iran by the IAEA or under its auspices as
provided for in paragraph 16 of resolution 1737 (2006);

(b) all items, materials, equipment, goods and technology set
out in 19.A.3 of Category II of document S/2006/815;

"9. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance in entering
into new commitments for public provided financial support for trade
with Iran, including the granting of export credits, guarantees or
insurance, to their nationals or entities involved in such trade, in
order to avoid such financial support contributing to the
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities, or to the development of
nuclear weapon delivery systems, as referred to in resolution 1737
(2006);

"10. Calls upon all States to exercise vigilance over the
activities of financial institutions in their territories with all
banks domiciled in Iran, in particular with Bank Melli and Bank
Saderat, and their branches and subsidiaries abroad, in order to
avoid such activities contributing to the proliferation sensitive
nuclear activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery
systems, as referred to in resolution 1737 (2006);

"11. Calls upon all States, in accordance with their national
legal authorities and legislation and consistent with international
law, in particular the law of the sea and relevant international
civil aviation agreements, to inspectthe cargoes to and from Iran, of
aircraft and vessels, at their airports and seaports, owned or
operated by Iran Air Cargo and Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping
Line, provided there are reasonable grounds to believe that the
aircraft or vessel is transporting goods prohibited under this
resolution or resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

"12. Requires all States, in cases when inspection mentioned in
the paragraph above is undertaken, to submit to the Security Council
within five working days a written report on the inspection
containing, in particular, explanation of the grounds for the
inspection, as well as information on its time, place, circumstances,
results and other relevant details;

"13. Calls upon all States to report to the Committee within 60
days of the adoption of this resolution on the steps they have taken
with a view to implementing effectively paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10
and 11 above;

"14. Decides that the mandate of the Committee as set out in
paragraph 18 of resolution 1737 (2006) shall also apply to the
measures imposed in resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution;

"15. Stresses the willingness of China, France, Germany, the
Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States to
further enhance diplomatic efforts to promote resumption of dialogue,
and consultations on the basis of their offer to Iran, with a view to
seeking a comprehensive, long-term and proper solution of this issue
which would allow for the development of all-round relations and
wider cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the
establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme, and inter alia, starting direct
talks and negotiation with Iran as long as Iran suspends all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research
and development, as verified by the IAEA;

"16. Encourages the European Union High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy to continue communication with
Iran in support of political and diplomatic efforts to find a
negotiated solution including relevant proposals by China, France,
Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United
States with a view to create necessary conditions for resuming talks;

"17. Emphasizes the importance of all States, including Iran,
taking the necessary measures to ensure that no claim shall lie at
the instance of the Government of Iran, or of any person or entity in
Iran, or of persons or entities designated pursuant to resolution
1737 (2006) and related resolutions, or any person claiming through
or for the benefit of any such person or entity, in connection with
any contract or other transaction where its performance was prevented
by reason of the measures imposed by the present resolution,
resolution 1737 (2006) or resolution 1747 (2007);

"18. Requests within 90 days a further report from the Director
General of the IAEA on whether Iran has established full and
sustained suspension of all activities mentioned in resolution 1737
(2006), as well as on the process of Iranian compliance with all the
steps required by the IAEA Board and with the other provisions of
resolution 1737 (2006), resolution 1747 (2007) and of this
resolution, to the IAEA Board of Governors and in parallel to the
Security Council for its consideration;

"19. Reaffirms that it shall review Iran’s actions in light of
the report referred to in the paragraph above, and:

(a) that it shall suspend the implementation of measures if and
for so long as Iran suspends all enrichment-related and reprocessing
activities, including research and development, as verified by the
IAEA, to allow for negotiations in good faith in order to reach an
early and mutually acceptable outcome;

(b) that it shall terminate the measures specified in
paragraphs 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 12 of resolution 1737 (2006), as well as
in paragraphs 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of resolution 1747 (2007), and in
paragraphs 3, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 11 above, as soon as it determines,
following receipt of the report referred to in the paragraph above,
that Iran has fully complied with its obligations under the relevant
resolutions of the Security Council and met the requirements of the
IAEA Board of Governors, as confirmed by the IAEA Board;

(c) that it shall, in the event that the report shows that Iran
has not complied with resolution 1696 (2006), resolution 1737 (2006),
resolution 1747 (2007) and this resolution, adopt further appropriate
measures under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter of the United
Nations to persuade Iran to comply with these resolutions and the
requirements of the IAEA, and underlines that further decisions will
be required should such additional measures be necessary;

"20. Decides to remain seized of the matter."

Resolution Annex I

1. Amir Moayyed Alai (involved in managing the assembly and
engineering of centrifuges)

2. Mohammad Fedai Ashiani (involved in the production of
ammonium uranyl carbonate and management of the Natanz enrichment
complex)

3. Abbas Rezaee Ashtiani (a senior official at the AEOI Office
of Exploration and Mining Affairs)

4. Haleh Bakhtiar (involved in the production of magnesium at
a concentration of 99.9%)

5. Morteza Behzad (involved in making centrifuge components)

6. Dr. Mohammad Eslami (Head of Defence Industries Training
and Research Institute)

7. Seyyed Hussein Hosseini (AEOI official involved in the
heavy water research reactor project at Arak)

8. M. Javad Karimi Sabet (Head of Novin Energy Company, which
is designated under resolution 1747 (2007))

9. Hamid-Reza Mohajerani (involved in production management at
the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan)

10. Brigadier-General Mohammad Reza Naqdi (former Deputy Chief
of Armed Forces General Staff for Logistics and Industrial
Research/Head of State Anti-Smuggling Headquarters, engaged in
efforts to get round the sanctions imposed by resolutions 1737 (2006)
and 1747 (2007))

11. Houshang Nobari (involved in the management of the Natanz
enrichment complex)

12. Abbas Rashidi (involved in enrichment work at Natanz)

13. Ghasem Soleymani (Director of Uranium Mining Operations at
the Saghand Uranium Mine)

Resolution Annex II

A. Individuals listed in resolution 1737 (2006)

1. Mohammad Qannadi, AEOI Vice President for Research & Development

2. Dawood Agha-Jani, Head of the PFEP (Natanz)

3. Behman Asgarpour, Operational Manager ( Arak)

B. Individuals listed in resolution 1747 (2007)

1. Seyed Jaber Safdari (Manager of the Natanz Enrichment Facilities)

2. Amir Rahimi (Head of Esfahan Nuclear Fuel Research and
Production Centre, which is part of the AEOI’s Nuclear Fuel
Production and Procurement Company, which is involved in
enrichment-related activities)

Resolution Annex III

1. Abzar Boresh Kaveh Co. (BK Co.) (involved in the production
of centrifuge components)

2. Barzagani Tejarat Tavanmad Saccal companies (subsidiary of
Saccal System companies) (this company tried to purchase sensitive
goods for an entity listed in resolution 1737 (2006))

3. Electro Sanam Company (E. S. Co./E. X. Co.) (AIO
front-company, involved in the ballistic missile programme)

4. Ettehad Technical Group (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)

5. Industrial Factories of Precision (IFP) Machinery (aka
Instrumentation Factories Plant) (used by AIO for some acquisition
attempts)

6. Jabber Ibn Hayan (AEOI laboratory involved in fuel-cycle activiti=
es)

7. Joza Industrial Co. (AIO front-company, involved in the
ballistic missile programme)

8. Khorasan Metallurgy Industries (subsidiary of the
Ammunition Industries Group (AMIG) which depends on DIO. Involved in
the production of centrifuges components)

9. Niru Battery Manufacturing Company (subsidiary of the DIO.
Its role is to manufacture power units for the Iranian military
including missile systems)

10. Pishgam (Pioneer) Energy Industries (has participated in
construction of the Uranium Conversion Facility at Esfahan)

11. Safety Equipment Procurement (SEP) (AIO front-company,
involved in the ballistic missile programme)

12. TAMAS Company (involved in enrichment-related activities.
TAMAS is the overarching body, under which four subsidiaries have
been established, including one for uranium extraction to
concentration and another in charge of uranium processing, enrichment
and waste)

Statements

MOHAMMAD KHAZAEE (Iran) said: "Today’s action of some members of
the Security Council against Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme, along
with the measures taken in this regard in the past, do not meet the
minimum standards of legitimacy and legality." Iran’s peaceful
nuclear programme had been brought to the Council in violation of the
[International Atomic Energy Agency’s] statute; Iran had not violated
the Non-Proliferation Treaty’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement.
It had signed the Additional Protocol in 2003 and had begun its
voluntary implementation, which it was not supposed to have begun
implementing prior to 2003. In addition, Iran was only obliged to
inform IAEA 180 days prior to feeding nuclear material into
facilities, but it had informed the Agency about the uranium
conversion facility four years prior to its operation in 2004, and
also four years before Iran had been obliged to do so.

He said Iran’s nuclear programme had been, and would remain,
absolutely peaceful, and in no way posed any threat to international
peace and security. It, therefore, did not fall within the Council’s
purview. The peaceful nature of his country’s nuclear programme had
been confirmed by each and every IAEA report in the past several
years. On the basis of ideological and strategic grounds, Iran
categorically rejected the development, stockpiling and use of
nuclear weapons, as well as of all other weapons of mass destruction,
and it was a leader in international efforts to oppose such weapons.
The IAEA Director General had stressed in various statements that
"the Agency does not have any data or evidence indicating that Iran
is trying to develop nuclear weapons" and that there was "no evidence
Iran’s enrichment of uranium is intended for a military nuclear
programme".

The outstanding issues were now resolved and closed, he stressed.
The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had argued in the past that the
Council should be involved due to unresolved outstanding questions.
However, Iran had concluded a work plan with IAEA in August 2007 to
address and resolve the outstanding issues. The conclusion of the
work plan had been described as "a significant step forward" by the
Director General. The co-sponsors of today’s resolution had spared
no efforts to hamper its successful implementation. The Agency’s 22
=46ebruary report, however, had "clearly declared the resolution and
closure of all outstanding issues". The Director General had said
after the report’s release, "we managed to clarify all the remaining
outstanding issues, including the most important issue, which is the
scope and nature of Iran’s enrichment programme".

By resolving the outstanding issues with regard to Iran’s past
activities on the one hand, and conducting all its present
activities, including the enrichment, under the full and continuous
monitoring of IAEA, the country had removed any so-called "concerns"
or "ambiguities" with regard to its peaceful nuclear activities in
the past and at present, Mr. Khazaee said. Those who had resorted
to a systematic and relentless campaign of false claims, propaganda,
intimidation and pressure aimed at IAEA had prompted one of its
senior officials to stress that "since 2002, pretty much all the
intelligence that’s come to us [from the United States] has proved to
be wrong". A well-organized and pre-planned propaganda campaign had
begun even before the release of the latest IAEA report, in order to
eclipse Iran’s resolving outstanding issues.

He said the full implementation of the work plan, and thus
resolution and closure of the outstanding issues, had eliminated the
most basic pretexts and allegations, on the basis of which Iran’s
peaceful nuclear programme had been referred to the Council. "
Iran’s peaceful nuclear programme should be dealt with solely by the
Agency."

Addressing the suspension issue, he said that Iran could not and
would not accept a requirement that was legally defective and
politically coercive. Neither in the IAEA’s statute, nor in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards, not even in the Additional
Protocol, were "enrichment" and "reprocessing" prohibited. There was
not even a limit for the level of enrichment. Voluntary suspension
had been in place for more than two years in Iran and that had been
verified. It had become clear, however, that those insisting on
suspension had indeed aimed to prolong and ultimately perpetuate it,
and thus deprive Iran from exercising its inalienable rights. The
attempt to make the suspension mandatory through the Council, from
the outset, had violated the fundamental principles of international
law, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and IAEA Board of Governors’
resolutions.

He said the Council’s decision to coerce Iran into suspension had
also been a gross violation of the United Nations Charter’s Article
25. The Council could not coerce countries into submitting either to
its decisions taken in bad faith or to its demands negating the
fundamental purposes and principles of the Charter. Iran needed to
enrich uranium to provide fuel for the nuclear reactors it was
planning to build to meet the growing energy needs. There had never
been guarantees that those fuel needs would be provided fully by
foreign sources. No country could solely rely on others to provide
it with the technology and materials that were vital for its
development and for the welfare of its people.

As a representative of a founding Member of the United Nations,
he expressed "grave concern and dismay regarding the path that the
Security Council has chosen and pursued". The Council should be a
secure and safe place where the rights of nations, not only were not
violated, but were fully respected. A question arose as to why,
after all the crimes of the Zionist regime in the Occupied
Palestinian Territory had had been described as ethnic cleansing,
genocide and war crimes by the international community, the Council
had failed to put an end to those crimes. Recalling the Council’s
inaction after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Iran on 22 September
1980, he said "no amount of explanation would be able to describe the
disastrous consequences of these unacceptable behaviours of the
Security Council".

The Council’s behaviour in undermining the credibility and
integrity of IAEA would only serve the interests of those who
preferred to ignore the Agency, such as the Israeli regime, which,
with hundreds of nuclear warheads in its possession, posed the most
serious threat to international and regional peace and security. "Is
it not time for the Council to respect the judgement of an
institution that is part of the UN system? Or to respect the
legitimate rights of a great nation with a long history of
civilization and peaceful coexistence with other nations?" he asked.
The future security of the world depended on how the United Nations,
and especially the Security Council, functioned in a just and
impartial manner. In reality, peoples across the globe had now lost
their trust in the Council and considered its actions the result of
political pressure exerted by a few Powers to advance their own
agendas.

DUMISANI S. KUMALO (South Africa) regretted that the sponsors of
the resolution persisted with the same text they had tabled before
the IAEA Director General’s report. The resolution appeared not to
adequately take into account the progress that had been made between
Iran and the Agency. Adoption of the new resolution could not even
be postponed until the IAEA Board had had a full opportunity to
consider the matter. That left the impression that the verification
work and progress made by the Agency was virtually irrelevant to the
co-sponsors.

He said the rationale to bring the issue to the Council was to
reinforce the decisions of the Agency and enhance its authority, yet
the resolution did not accurately reflect what was happening at the
Agency. He was seriously concerned about the implications of that
for the Security Council’s credibility, and the only reason South
Africa supported the resolution was to preserve the unanimity behind
previous Council decisions.

IAEA was the only international authority that could provide
necessary assurances as to the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
programme, he said. It was unfortunate that the Council gave the
impression that it was in such haste to decide on further punitive
sanctions that it did not wish to consider the progress being made
through IAEA to provide factual information on implementation of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s safeguards in Iran. The Director
General’s report clearly showed that all outstanding safeguard issues
had been clarified and the Agency had not found evidence of diversion.

Since the adoption of resolution 1747 (2007) and following the
release of the United States national intelligence estimate, the
situation had changed, he said. Since all outstanding issues had
been clarified, there should be increased confidence in the peaceful
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. At the same time, the need for
continued factual information about Iran’s current nuclear activities
could be said to be more important in the context of the recent
allegations of weaponization activities.

Also important, he noted, was not to jeopardize any of the gains
made, and the Council should seek to build on progress made through
the continued verification of the Agency’s work. Given the
"confidence deficit" that existed, he urged moving forward in a
responsible manner.

South Africa did not wish to see a nuclear-weaponsized Iran or
the denial of the right of any signatory to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty to exploit the peaceful applications of nuclear technology, he
said. Nor did South Africa want to see a war break out over the
nuclear programme in Iran. Additionally, the suspension of
enrichment activities should not become a goal in itself. The
Council should assure Iran that the call for suspension was not a
smokescreen for any indefinite suspension or termination.

He said it was also important to terminate the sanctions once
IAEA had addressed the remaining issues. In addition, the
restrictions on dual-use goods and on loans and credits must not be
allowed to have a negative impact on the civilian population of Iran.
Security Council members that voted in favour of the resolution,
including South Africa, had a special obligation to the Iranian
people and must exercise the highest degree of oversight in the
implementation of the sanctions to ensure no unintended consequences.

IBRAHIM O. A. DABBASHI (Libya) said his country attached great
importance to nuclear non-proliferation and it was not continuing in
its programme. The only guarantee of the non-use of weapons of mass
destruction was their elimination. In that context, he favoured
nuclear-weapon-free zones throughout the world, including the Middle
East, and had supported resolutions in that regard, including in the
context of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference of the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as resolutions adopted by the
General Assembly, including in 2007. Non-proliferation and
disarmament were comprehensive issues and should be applied without
discrimination.

He said the Council had not attached appropriate importance to
Israeli nuclear weapons, despite the fact that Israel had refused to
take part in the Non-Proliferation Treaty or comply with the IAEA
safeguards regime. Israel had not taken into consideration the
repeated appeals against nuclear weapons, which could have "terrible
effects" in the region. Israel’s attitude, and the massacres it was
committing in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, showed that the
regime was "terrorist and irresponsible". It did not take into
consideration international law or international codes of conduct.
It was vital for the Council to deal with that subject
comprehensively, and for all countries to become party to the
Non-Proliferation Treaty.

While stressing the importance of nuclear non-proliferation, he
also reaffirmed the right of States parties to the Treaty, including
Iran, to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The report of the
IAEA Director General of 22 February showed that essential progress
had been made on the Iranian nuclear file and most outstanding issues
had been resolved. The draft resolution should have taken those
positive developments into consideration.

However, he said, given the fact that countries that had
developed the text had taken into account the concerns of other
members and that most believed it was appropriate to adopt the
resolution, despite the fact that his delegation did not agree with
the assessment process, Libya associated itself with the Council’s
consensus and would support the resolution, so as to promote one
Council viewpoint.

LE LUONG MINH (Viet Nam) said his country attached great
importance to all three major pillars of the Non-Proliferation Treaty
— non-proliferation, respect for the rights of all the parties to
develop, research and produce nuclear energy for peaceful purposes,
and nuclear disarmament. Viet Nam had proposed changes to the draft
resolution to the effect that Iran’s cooperation with IAEA and other
progress, as well as the authority and role of the Agency as the body
mandated to resolve the non-proliferation issues within the
Non-Proliferation Treaty’s framework would be more adequately
reflected. With the proposed changes having been incorporated, the
fact that IAEA had indicated that Iran still needed to respond to
requests by it and by the Council, as well as the fact that the scope
of implementation envisaged in the draft was basically the same as in
the previous resolutions adopted by consensus, Viet Nam would vote in
favour of it.

He said favourable conditions must be created, however, for the
peaceful solution of the Iran nuclear issue, including cessation of
hostile policies against Iran, assurance of Iran’s legitimate
security interests and respect for the right of Iran to use nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes. The establishment of a
nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the adherence by all
States in the region to the Non-Proliferation Treaty would be
positive steps in that direction. While hailing new progress in
cooperation between Iran and IAEA, he hoped that Iran’s efforts would
be positively matched in the coming period.

MARTY M. NATALEGAWA (Indonesia) underscored the imperative to
find a peaceful solution to any question related to nuclear
non-proliferation, one that was guided by the need to protect the
integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Indonesia had full
confidence in IAEA’s credibility and had been guided by its latest
report in determining the right course of action. He appreciated
Iran’s efforts for greater cooperation, which had allowed the Agency
to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material.
Iran had provided IAEA with access to declared nuclear material, as
well as required nuclear material accountancy reports in that
connection.

He noted that the Agency had considered that all remaining
outstanding issues contained in the work plan, with the exception of
one, had been resolved. The report stated that Iran had not
suspended its enrichment-related activities, had begun developing new
generation centrifuges and had continued its construction of the
IR-40 reactor of heavy water production. For the remaining one
issue, namely alleged weaponization studies, the report noted that
the Agency had not detected the use of nuclear material. However, it
also stated that it was "not yet in a position to determine the full
nature of Iran’s nuclear programme". It was important to note that
progress had been made in resolving the outstanding issues.

Noting the "well-calibrated nature" of the report, which depicted
well the complexity of the issue, he said that Indonesia had expected
that the draft resolution would reflect those complex dynamics and
mixed findings. In that context, he noted that the additional
sanctions had been described as "incremental" and that the Council
would suspend implementation if Iran curtailed all enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities.

"Essentially, we are not convinced whether more sanctions,
however incremental, well targeted and reversible, would move us
forward in resolving the question of Iran’s nuclear programme," he
said, wondering whether more sanctions at this juncture constituted
"the most sensible approach". Instead, he believed the lack of
confidence and trust was at the heart of the matter.

He said he expected Iran to continue to engage actively with the
Agency to build confidence about its programme. The Iran dossier was
referred to the Council to encourage the country to resolve
outstanding verification issues, and while work was ongoing, progress
had been made. Suspension of enrichment-related activities was not
an end in itself, isolated from developments in Iran’s cooperation
with IAEA.

There was often a vicious cycle, with no guarantee given to
non-nuclear-weapon States regarding the security of supply of nuclear
technology and materials for peaceful purposes; they were prone to
suspicion, he said. To end that cycle, it was imperative to move
forward in a constructive manner and renew the initiative to
establish a multilateral arrangement to guarantee the security of
supply of nuclear technology and material. That would provide
assurance to Iran and end existing suspicions. The Non-Proliferation
Treaty should be pursued in a balanced and non-discriminatory manner.

It was important to recognize that conditions today were
different than on the eve of adoption of resolution 1747 (2007), he
said. Iran was cooperating with IAEA and, at the present juncture,
more sanctions were not the best course. For that reason, Indonesia
would abstain in today’s vote.

Action

The Council then voted on the draft resolution, which was adopted
by a vote of 14 in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (Indonesia) as resolution 1803 (2008).

Statements

JOHN SAWERS (United Kingdom), reading a statement agreed by the
=46oreign Ministers of China, France, Germany, Russian Federation,
United Kingdom and the United States, with support of the High
Representative of the European Union, said that the Security Council
today adopted resolution 1803 (2008) reflecting the international
community’s ongoing serious concerns about the proliferation risks of
the Iranian nuclear programme. It was the third time the Council had
sent a strong message of international resolve to Iran by adopting a
sanctions resolution under Article 41 of Chapter VII of the Charter.
"We deplore Iran’s continued failure to comply with its United
Nations Security Council and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) Board requirements, in particular by expanding its
enrichment-related activities," he said.

He noted progress made in implementing the IAEA-Iran work plan,
but also the Agency’s serious concerns about the "alleged studies",
which were critical to an assessment of a possible military dimension
to the country’s nuclear programme. He called upon Iran to heed the
requirements of the Council and the Agency, including the suspension
of enrichment-related and reprocessing activities.

He said he remained committed to an early negotiated solution to
the Iranian nuclear issue, and reaffirmed the countries’ commitment
to a dual-track approach. Proposals presented to Iran in June 2006
offered "substantial opportunities" for political, security and
economic benefits to Iran and the region, and he urged Iran to take
the opportunity to find a negotiated way forward.

Reiterating the countries’ recognition of Iran’s right to
develop, research, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, he reconfirmed that, once the international community’s
confidence in the "exclusively peaceful nature" of Iran’s nuclear
programme was restored, Iran would be treated in the same manner as
any non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

He said the countries remained ready to negotiate future
arrangements, modalities and timing in that respect, once the
conditions had been established. As that would require further
diplomatic efforts, the European Union’s High Representative for
Common Foreign and Security Policy, Javier Solana, had been asked to
meet with Saeed Jalili, Secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security
Council, to address concerns of both sides.

Speaking in his national capacity, he said his Government
welcomed the "very broad support" for the Council’s resolution. Its
adoption underlined the global community’s profound concern that Iran
might be intending to use its nuclear programme for military
purposes. "The United Kingdom does not have confidence that Iran’s
programme is for exclusively peaceful purposes," he said.

The resolution was a necessary response to Iran’s failure to
comply with IAEA Board requirements, including suspension of all
enrichment-related and reprocessing activity and work on all
heavy-water-related projects, resolution of all outstanding questions
and implementation and ratification of the Additional Protocol.
Iran’s progress with IAEA addressed only one of those issues. Iran
had refused to answer the most difficult questions about its past
programmes. Overall, Iran had clearly failed to abide by its legal
obligations under successive Security Council resolutions.

The political statement agreed by the Foreign Ministers of the
"E3+3", with support of the European Union High Representative, had
made clear the commitment to a negotiated solution on the basis of
far-reaching proposals to which the six countries had agreed in June
2006, he said. "Our offer would give Iran everything it needs to
develop a modern civil nuclear power programme, including legally
guaranteed supplies of nuclear fuel." He regretted that Iran had
ignored the offer. Iran’s failure to do what was required, as stated
by IAEA, had left no other option but to seek further measures in the
Council.

He said those measures strengthened restrictions on individuals
and entities associated with Iran’s proliferation-sensitive nuclear
activities and ballistic missile programme, increased vigilance over
the activities of Iranian banks, introduced a provision for careful
scrutiny of new commitments for export credits to Iran and encouraged
States to inspect cargo to and from Iran. By adopting the text, the
Council had continued its "incremental and proportionate approach".
His Government urged Iran’s leaders to suspend its enrichment-related
and reprocessing activities, and cooperate fully with IAEA. With the
new resolution, the Council was reaffirming the clear choice
confronting Iran’s leaders: to cooperate with the global community or
pursue their nuclear programme in disregard of international
concerns. He hoped they would take the positive path.

JEAN-PIERRE LACROIX (France) saluted the almost unanimous
adoption of the resolution as a clear and firm message. The
Non-Proliferation Treaty had established a regime based on trust and
confidence. Iran had concealed an underground nuclear programme.
While enrichment was going on, Iran was working on techniques that
could be used to develop nuclear weapons. Iran was also actively
developing long-range missiles. Given that situation, the
international community’s request to restore confidence was
understandable. Iran must suspend proliferation-sensitive activities
and cooperate with IAEA. That was not a matter of refusing Iran the
right to develop nuclear energy. The Director General had concluded
that IAEA could not take a stand on the nature and scope of Iran’s
nuclear programme.

He said there was no choice but to adopt sanctions against the
country. Describing the measures in the current resolution, he said
the approach was not punitive. The priority was to find a diplomatic
solution. The Council would suspend the measures as soon as Iran
fully respected its obligations. Iran had been offered a proposal
for cooperation dealing with political, economic and nuclear
cooperation, as a way of extending a hand to the Iranian people. He
hoped that proposal would be accepted.

ZALMAY KHALILZAD (United States) said that, instead of
suspending its enrichment and reprocessing activities, as required by
the Council, Iran had chosen to dramatically expand its number of
operating centrifuges and to develop and test a new generation of
centrifuges. It continued the construction of its heavy-water
research reactor at Arak and it still had not implemented the
Additional Protocol. Once again, the Council had had no choice but
to act. "At stake is the security of a vital region of the world and
the credibility of the Security Council and the International Atomic
Energy Agency as they seek to hold Iran to its nuclear
non-proliferation commitments." The latest IAEA report had stated
that Iran had not met its obligation to fully disclose its past
nuclear weapons programme.

He said that, on the core issue of whether Iran’s nuclear
programme was strictly peaceful, the report had not shown serious
progress. IAEA had presented Iran with documents detailing Iran’s
efforts to develop a nuclear warhead and other possible undeclared
activities with nuclear material. Iran had dismissed those
documents as "baseless and fabricated". IAEA, however, did not share
that conclusion. "Instead of slogans and obfuscations, the
international community needs answers from Iran." The international
community must be able to believe Iran’s declaration that its nuclear
programme was for exclusively peaceful purposes.

Iranian leaders, as a first step, must cease enrichment and
reprocessing activities and make a full disclosure of all of its
weapons-related work, he said. Iran had not fully implemented the
Additional Protocol, which IAEA required in order to determine what
other undeclared nuclear activities were taking place. He asked, in
that regard, why Iranian leaders were not fully implementing the
additional safeguards and what it was hiding. If Iran wanted the
world to believe that its nuclear programme was peaceful, that
programme must be transparent with IAEA inspectors and Iran must
implement the Additional Protocol, as repeatedly called for by the
Council and IAEA.

He said the United States recognized Iran’s right to develop
nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The five permanent members of
the Council and Germany had offered to help Iran develop civil
nuclear power, and the Russian Federation had supplied fuel for
Iran’s nuclear power plan in Bushehr. That had exposed Iran’s false
claim that it needed to enrich uranium for civil nuclear power.
Seventeen countries generating nuclear power purchased their fuel on
the international market, rather than enrich uranium themselves.
Iran should follow the example of other States that had abandoned
nuclear weapons programmes, two of them now sitting on the Council,
namely South Africa and Libya.

The international community had good reason to be concerned about
Iran’s activities, as the present regime armed with nuclear weapons
would pose a greater potential danger to the region and to the world,
he warned. Iran had been funding and supporting terrorists and
militants in Lebanon, the Palestinian Territory, Iraq and
Afghanistan. The President of Iran had embraced the objective of
destroying a Member State of the United Nations. The ministerial
statement agreed to by the "P5+1" showed a commitment to a diplomatic
solution. "It gives us not pleasure, but regret, to have to pass
another sanctions resolution. But our vote today demonstrates that
the Council will act when countries violate their international
obligations." He hoped Iran would engage in constructive
negotiations over the future of its nuclear programme. Such
negotiations, if successful, would have profound benefits for Iran
and the Iranian people.

WANG GUANGYA (China) said today’s resolution was the Security
Council’s fourth on the Iranian nuclear issue since July 2006. It
reflected international concern at, and expectations of all parties
regarding an early settlement through diplomatic negotiations of, the
Iranian nuclear issue. Developments vis-=E0-vis the Iranian issue had
been mixed. On one hand, the Director General’s latest report
suggested that the Agency could verify the non-diversion of declared
nuclear material in Iran and had no concrete information about
possible undeclared nuclear material and activities. Iran had
clarified such outstanding issues as uranium contamination and
polonium experiments, and had provided information similar to that
which it had provided previously, pursuant to the Additional Protocol.

He said his country welcomed the cooperation between Iran and
IAEA, but the report had also stated that Iran had not suspended its
enrichment activities, as required by Security Council resolutions,
and it had started development of centrifuges. As the impasse had
not been broken, the international community was calling for more
diplomatic efforts, and hoped that parties could bring the issue back
on the track of settlement.

Against that backdrop, the Council’s resolution was not aimed at
punishing Iran; rather urging its return to the negotiating table, he
said. The sanctions were not targeted at the Iranian people, and
would not affect Iran’s normal economic and financial activities with
other countries. Indeed, the measures were reversible: if Iran
complied with the Security Council and IAEA resolutions, the
sanctions would be suspended or terminated.

He reiterated that sanctions could not resolve issues; they could
only promote negotiations. Indeed, the best approach was through
diplomatic negotiating. All parties should adopt a highly
responsible attitude, and he further urged flexibility and sincerity
in resuming talks. Efforts to seek a solution should assure Iran’s
right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy and to address
international nuclear non-proliferation concerns. Iran should fully
comply with IAEA and Security Council resolutions, as soon as
possible.

Noting that the six Foreign Ministers had expressed their
readiness to increase diplomatic efforts to vigorously facilitate the
resumption of negotiations, he said China hoped that all would engage
in closer contact on the basis of mutual respect, including for each
others’ concerns, and increased mutual trust, and seek an approach
that was acceptable to all. His Government was ready to work with
all parties to settle the Iranian nuclear issue.

JORGE URBINA ORTEGA (Costa Rica) said he could not accept that
the representative of Iran had stated that the Council had acted on
the instigation of some countries. There were still areas of
non-compliance by Iran with Council resolutions.

The strategic approach to preventing proliferation was based on
the willingness of States that lacked nuclear weapons not to acquire
them, and the decision of the nuclear-weapon States to gradually
reduce their arsenals, he said. However, some countries that were
not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty had developed nuclear
weapons programmes with total impunity. Real progress in disarmament
required that, not only horizontal proliferation had to be stopped,
but also vertical proliferation, meaning that the continuous
development of new technologies should also be halted.

He could not endorse the behaviour of some States that demanded
that others comply with their obligations stemming from the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban
Treaty, while disregarding some of their own responsibilities. There
was very little incentive for non-proliferation in an international
environment in which there was feeble progress in disarmament and
weak guarantees that the existing nuclear weapons would not be
utilized.

There was a need for a transparent, sustainable and credible plan
for multilateral nuclear disarmament and to create a virtuous circle
where progress in disarmament and non-proliferation could mutually
reinforce one another, he said. His country respected the right of
every State to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but
considered that right to be contingent on the fulfilment of all
international obligations on the matter. The right to enrich uranium
was a legitimate activity if its scope and objectives were subjected
to complete international supervision through absolutely transparent
processes. "We believe this is still not the case of the Iranian
nuclear programme, and for this reason, we are obligated to support
the resolution that we are voting on today," he said.

The situation in Gaza was a different matter, he said. He
expressed concern at the humanitarian situation in the region and had
condemned attacks on Israel. His country had also criticized
non-action by the Council.

MICHEL KAFANDO (Burkina Faso) said his country, since the start
of consideration of the Iranian question, had registered its
reservations about considering a resolution prior to the issuance of
the IAEA report on Iran’s nuclear programme, as it recognized any
country’s right to achieve nuclear energy for civilian purposes.
Burkina Faso had examined the IAEA report and noted the absence of
full cooperation on the part of Iran, as well as the fact that IAEA
could not determine the exact nature of the Iranian nuclear programme.

He stressed that all States parties to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty must fully disclose their information, and that view was
further supported by the report’s description of uranium enrichment
activities and the development of new centrifuges. He had also noted
the report’s statement on the refusal of Iran to implement the
Additional Protocol. For those reasons — and to encourage Iran’s
full cooperation with IAEA, notably by providing specific information
on its nuclear programme — Burkina Faso had voted in favour of the
resolution.

The objective of the additional measures was not to choke Iran or
to create prejudice; it was simply to encourage Iran’s cooperation
with the Agency and the transparency of its programme, he explained.
He urged that dialogue continue to persuade Iran that it was in its
interest to subscribe to the safeguards system. In that spirit, he
approved the statement made by the Foreign Ministers of the six
countries, which expressed a desire for increased dialogue with Iran.
He was convinced that, only through negotiations would the Iranian
issue be resolved.

JOHAN VERBEKE (Belgium) said he had voted in favour of the
resolution and welcomed its adoption by a large majority. He
regretted that Iran was still not in compliance with Council
resolutions aimed at suspension of uranium enrichment and
heavy-water-related projects. The 22 February IAEA report had
concluded that the Director General was not in a position to provide
guarantees regarding non-declared material and the peaceful nature of
Iran’s nuclear programme. The new resolution was part of a gradual
approach aimed at urging Iranian authorities to adopt a more
cooperative and transparent position. The resolution also made clear
that the path of good faith negotiations remained open to Iran.

ALFREDO SUESCUM (Panama) said he regretted that, once again,
sanctions had to be imposed on Iran. The necessity of applying
coercive measures reflected a failure of diplomacy on the part of all
parties. As a State party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Iran must
adhere to restrictions related to development and proliferation of
nuclear weapons, but had the right to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes, including enrichment. That right, however,
involved important obligations, including the open and transparent
inspection by IAEA.

He said that, according to its last report, IAEA could not
provide guarantees on the absence of non-declared materials and was
still not in a position to determine the nature of the
uranium-enrichment programme. Until there was clarity on the current
scope of the nuclear programme, Iran had not fully complied with its
obligations. Although the Council had required that Iran suspend
enrichment activities, it had not done so, according to the IAEA
report, and, therefore, was not complying with Council resolutions.
=46or those reasons, Panama had voted in favour of the resolution, but
hoped that the situation could be solved promptly.

NEVEN JURICA (Croatia) said his country, as an active member of
the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the IAEA Board, attached importance
to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and fully
shared the concerns of the wider international community. Every
State had the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but
it was also important to abide by international obligations. While
the report’s findings were satisfactory, they did not paint an
overall positive picture, as they pointed to Iran’s avoidance of key
questions. Iran’s failure to provide a clear response left
questions about the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear
programme.

He noted that IAEA had also pointed to possible military
dimensions to the programme and to provisions of resolution 1747
(2007) that had not been implemented. Further, Iran had not
suspended its enrichment-related activities. In light of that,
Croatia had voted in favour of the resolution. Following that, his
Government welcomed the commitment of the six Foreign Ministers to
continue with all diplomatic efforts to resolve the issues.

Council President VITALY I. CHURKIN (Russian Federation),
speaking in his national capacity, said his Government had supported
the resolution and was pleased that the work of the six Foreign
Ministers had brought the Council to a text that was balanced and met
the tasks at hand. Indeed, the resolution was a political signal to
Iran on the need for cooperation, on the basis of implementing
recommendations. It was important for the six countries now to
develop proposals for further talks, from which Iran and the region
could benefit. The Council recognized Iran’s rights under the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Once confidence was restored, Iran would
be treated in the same manner as any other Treaty party.

He said today’s decision, similar to those in resolutions 1747
(2007) and 1737 (2006), was taken under Article 41 of Chapter VII of
the Charter and called for no use of force whatsoever. Effective
solution of the problem could be found only in the political and
diplomatic sphere. His Government favoured a "fresh approach" and
was prepared to facilitate talks to settle pending issues.
Hopefully, Iran would analyse today’s statements and choose to meet
the requirements of both the Council and IAEA, and help to launch
negotiations. The six countries must also be willing to engage in
constructive cooperation with Iran.

* *** *

For information media * not an official record


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