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IRANIAN PLEA
A Letter from the Iranian Embassy in Canberra to Friends of the Earth Australia


Published 13 March 2006

In order to inform public opinion as widely as possible about the current "Iran crisis", we place on this website the following letter to FoE-Australia, despite its length. This does not mean that ACDN agrees with everything in it. We want particularly to insist on the fact that, if a diplomatic solution is needed, there exists a means of resolving the crisis in the general interest other than by developing nuclear power. We have already outlined it here.


An Unnecessary Crisis Setting the record straight
about Iran’s nuclear program:

In a region already suffering from upheaval and
uncertainty, a crisis is being manufactured in which
there will be no winners. Worse yet, the hysteria
about the dangers of an alleged Iran nuclear weapon
program rest solely and intentionally on
misperceptions and outright lies. In the avalanche of
anti-Iran media commentaries, conspicuously absent is
any reference to important facts, coupled with a
twisted representation of the developments over the
past 25 years. Before the international community is
lead to another “crisis of choice”, it is imperative
that the public knows all the facts and is empowered
to make an informed and sober decision about an
impending catastrophe.

1- Systematic Pattern of Denial of Iran’s Rights and
Its Impact on Transparency

Since early 1980s, Iran’s peaceful nuclear program and
its inalienable right to nuclear technology have been
the subject of the most extensive and intensive
campaign of denial, obstruction, intervention and
misinformation.

• Valid and binding contracts to build nuclear power
plants were unilaterally abrogated;

• Nuclear material rightfully purchased and owned by
Iran was illegally withheld;

• Exercise of Iran’s right as a shareholder in several
national and multinational nuclear power corporations
was obstructed;

• Unjustified and coercive interventions were
routinely made in order to undermine, impede and delay
the implementation of Iran’s nuclear agreements with
third parties; and Unfounded accusations against
Iran’s exclusively peaceful nuclear program were
systematically publicized.

As a result, and merely in order to prevent further
illegal and illegitimate restrictions on its ability
to procure its needed materials and equipments, Iran
had been left with no option but to be discrete in its
perfectly legal and exclusively peaceful activities.
In doing so, Iran broke no laws nor diverted its
peaceful program to military activities. It only
refrained from disclosing the details of its programs.
In nearly all cases, it was not even obliged to
disclose these programs under its safeguards agreement
with the IAEA.

Therefore, while Iran’s rights under the NPT continued
to be grossly and systematically violated, and while
major state parties to the Treaty persisted in their
non-compliance with many of their obligations under
Articles I, IV and VI of the Treaty in general, and
under paragraph 2 of Article IV vis-à-vis Iran in
particular, Iran nevertheless continued to diligently
comply with all its obligations under the Treaty.

2. Nuclear Technology OR Nuclear Weapons?

A vicious cycle of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear
program and attempts by Iran to circumvent them
through concealment and black market acquisitions have
fueled mutual suspicions. In this self-perpetuating
atmosphere, the conclusion is already drawn that
Iran’s declared peaceful nuclear program is just a
cover for developing atomic weapons. But this
conclusion is based on two erroneous assumptions,
which have been repeated often enough to become
conventional wisdom.

2.1- Iran Needs Nuclear Energy

2.1.1. Nuclear Energy for an Oil-Rich Country

The first is that Iran has vast oil and gas resources
and therefore does not need nuclear energy. Although
it is true that Iran is rich in oil and gas, these
resources are finite and, given the pace of Iran’s
economic development, they will be depleted within two
to five decades. With a territory of 1,648,000 km2 and
a population of about 70 million, projected to be more
than 105 million in 2050, Iran has no choice but to
seek access to more diversified and secure sources of
energy. Availability of electricity to 46,000 villages
now, compared to 4400 twenty five years ago, just as
an example, demonstrates the fast growing demand for
more energy. And the youthfulness of the Iranian
population, with around 70% under 30, doesn’t allow
complacency when it comes to energy policy. To satisfy
such growing demands, Iran can’t rely exclusively on
fossil energy. Since Iranian national economy is still
dependant on oil revenue, it can’t allow the ever
increasing domestic demand affect the oil revenues
from the oil export.

2.1.2. US Support for Iranian Nuclear Program

Iran’s quest for nuclear energy picked momentum
following a study in 1974 carried out by the
prestigious US-based Stanford Research Institute,
which predicted Iran’s need for nuclear energy and
recommended the building of nuclear plants capable of
generating 20,000 megawatts of electricity before
1994. Now, 30 years later, Iran aims at reaching that
level by 2020, which may save Iran 190 million barrels
of crude oil or $10 billion per year in today’s
prices.

Therefore, Iran’s nuclear program is neither ambitious
nor economically unjustifiable. Diversification -
including the development of nuclear energy - is the
only sound and responsible energy strategy for Iran.
Even the US State Department was convinced of this in
1978 when it stated in a memo that the U.S. was
encouraged by Iran’s efforts to expand its non-oil
energy base and was hopeful that the U.S.-Iran Nuclear
Energy Agreement would be concluded soon and that U.S.
companies would be able to play a role in Iran’s
nuclear energy projects.

2.1.3. Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Producing fuel for its nuclear power plants is an
integral part of Iran’s nuclear energy policy. While
domestic production of fuel for this number of nuclear
power plants makes perfect economic sense, Iran’s
decision should not be judged solely on economic
grounds. Having been a victim of a pattern of
deprivation from peaceful nuclear material and
technology, Iran cannot solely rely on procurement of
fuel from outside sources. Such dependence would in
effect hold Iran’s multi-billion dollar investment in
power plants hostage to the political whims of
suppliers in a tightly controlled market. Furthermore,
it is self evident that the time-consuming efforts to
gain the necessary technology and develop the
capability for fuel production must proceed
simultaneously with the acquisition and construction
of nuclear power plants. Otherwise constructed plans
may become obsolete in case of denial of fuel without
a contingency capacity to produce it domestically.

2.2. Iran Does Not Need Nuclear Weapons for Its
Security

The second false assumption is that because Iran is
surrounded by nuclear weapons in all directions - the
U.S., Russia, Pakistan and Israel - any sound Iranian
strategists must be seeking to develop a nuclear
deterrent capability for Iran as well.
It is true that Iran has neighbors with abundant
nuclear weapons, but this does not mean that Iran must
follow suit. In fact, the predominant view among
Iranian decision-makers is that development,
acquisition or possession of nuclear weapons would
only undermine Iranian security. Viable security for
Iran can be attained only through inclusion and
regional and global engagement. Iran’s history is the
perfect illustration of its geo-strategic outlook.
Over the past 250 years, Iran has not waged a single
war of aggression against its neighbors, nor has it
initiated any hostilities.

Iran today is the strongest country in its immediate
neighborhood. It does not need nuclear weapons to
protect its regional interests. In fact, to augment
Iranian influence in the region, it has been necessary
for Iran to win the confidence of its neighbors, who
have historically been concerned with size and power
disparities.

On the other hand, Iran, with its current state of
technological development and military capability,
cannot reasonably rely on nuclear deterrence against
its adversaries in the international arena or in the
wider region of the Middle East. Moreover, such an
unrealistic option would be prohibitively expensive,
draining the limited economic resources of the
country. In sum, a costly nuclear-weapon option would
reduce Iran’s regional influence and increase its
global vulnerabilities without providing any credible
deterrence.

There is also a fundamental ideological objection to
weapons of mass destruction, including a religious
decree issued by the leader of the Islamic Republic of
Iran prohibiting the development, stockpiling or use
of nuclear weapons.

3. Negotiations with UK, France and Germany (EU3)

3.1. Iran’s Transparency and Confidence-Building
Measures

in October 2003, Iran entered into an understanding
with France, Germany and the United Kingdom with the
explicit expectation to open a new chapter of full
transparency, cooperation and access to nuclear and
other advanced technologies. Iran agreed to a number
of important transparency and voluntary confidence
building measures and immediately and fully
implemented them.

• It signed and immediately began full implementation
of the Additional Protocol;

• It opened its doors to one of the most expansive and
intrusive IAEA inspections;

• It provided a detailed account of its peaceful
nuclear activities, all of which had been carried out
in full conformity with its rights and obligations
under the NPT; It began and has continuously
maintained for the past 2 years a voluntarily
suspension of its rightful enrichment of Uranium as a
confidence building measure;

• It further expanded its voluntary suspension in
February and November 2004, following agreements with
EU3 in Brussels and Paris respectively, to incorporate
activities which go well beyond the original IAEA’s
definition of “enrichment” and even
“enrichment-related” activities.

3.1.1. Resolution of Outstanding Issues

Iran has worked closely with the IAEA, during the
course of the last two years, to deal with the issues
and questions raised about its peaceful nuclear
program. All significant issues, particularly those
related to the sources of HEU (Highly Enriched
Uranium) have now been resolved. Indeed, except for
few mostly speculative questions, nothing more remains
to close this Chapter

3.1.2. No Indication of Non-Peaceful Activity

The Agency’s thorough inspections of Iran have
repeatedly confirmed Iran’s assertion that no amount
of inspection and scrutiny will ever show the
slightest diversion into military activity. The
Director-General confirmed in Paragraph 52 of his
November 2003 report that “to date, there is no
evidence that the previously undeclared nuclear
material and activities referred to above were related
to a nuclear weapons program.” After one more year and
over a thousand person-days of the most rigorous
inspections, the Director-General again confirmed in
Paragraph 112 of his November 2004 report that “all
the declared nuclear material in Iran has been
accounted for, and therefore such material is not
diverted to prohibited activities.” This conclusion
has been repeatedly reaffirmed in every statement by
responsible authorities of the IAEA.

3.2. Broken Promises and Expanded Demands by the EU3

Regrettably, Iran received very little, if anything,
in return for its transparency, cooperation and
voluntary suspension of the exercise of its legitimate
and inalienable right. The European negotiating
partners, pressured by the US, instead of carrying out
their promises of cooperation and open access, have
repeatedly called for expansion of Iran’s voluntary
confidence building measures only to be reciprocated
by more broken promises and expanded requests:

• The October 2003 promises of the EU3 on nuclear
cooperation and regional security and
non-proliferation was never even addressed.

• The February 2004 written and signed commitment by
the EU3 to “work actively to gain recognition at the
June 2004 Board of the efforts made by Iran, so that
the Board works thereafter on the basis of
Director-General reporting if and when he deems it
necessary, in accordance with the normal practice
pertaining to the implementation of Safeguards
Agreements and the Additional Protocol” was violated,
even though Iran had in fact carried out its part of
the deal by expanding its suspension to include
assembly and component manufacturing. Instead, the EU3
proposed a harsh resolution with further unjustifiable
demands in June 2004;

• The EU3 never honored its recognition, in the Paris
Agreement of November 2004, of “Iran’s rights under
the NPT exercised in conformity with its obligations
under the Treaty, without discrimination.”
In spite of its repeated and publicized claims, the
EU3 never offered, throughout the negotiations
process, any meaningful incentives to Iran, other than
empty and demeaning “promises” of “consideration” of
“possible future cooperation”.

4. The Paris Agreement

In November 2004, following extensive negotiations,
Iran and EU3 agreed on a package that has become known
as the Paris Agreement. The objective of the Paris
Agreement was to “to move forward” in “negotiations,
with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable
agreement on long term arrangements. The agreement
will provide objective guarantees that Iran’s nuclear
program is exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will
equally provide firm guarantees on nuclear,
technological and economic cooperation and firm
commitments on security issues.”

The Paris Agreement envisaged that “while negotiations
proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on
long-term arrangements,” and “to build further
confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to
continue and extend its suspension to include all
enrichment related and reprocessing activities.”
At the same time, the EU3 recognized “that this
suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure
and not a legal obligation” as well as “Iran’s rights
under the NPT exercised in conformity with its
obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.”

The Paris Agreement rested on the premise that the
purpose of the Agreement was reaching mutually
acceptable long term arrangements and that suspension
was a temporary measure for as long as negotiations
were making progress. The Agreement further envisaged
specific mechanisms to monitor and assess progress.

4.1. March Report: Lack of Progress

In March 2005, in accordance with the Paris Agreement,
senior officials from Iran and the three European
countries were mandated to make an assessment of the
progress that had been achieved. The reports of over
three months of negotiations by the working groups,
created by the Paris Agreement, made it evident that
while there was every prospect for reaching a
negotiated solution based on the Paris Agreement, and
while Iran had made many significant and far-reaching
proposals benefiting both sides, the EU3, faced with
extraneous pressure, were simply trying to prolong
fruitless negotiations. This policy, in addition to
its devastating impact on mutual trust, was
detrimental to Iran’s interests and rights as it
attempted to superficially prolong Iran’s voluntary
suspension by dragging the negotiations.

It also became evident that despite repeated requests
by Iran from EU3 representatives to present their
proposals and ideas on the implementation of various
provisions of the Paris Agreement to the working
groups, the European three did not have the intention
or the ability to present its proposals on “objective
guarantees that Iran’s nuclear program is exclusively
for peaceful purposes [and] equally ... firm guarantees
on nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and
firm commitments on security issues” as called for in
that Agreement.

In short, it became evident that after massive
pressure from the United States in the winter of 2005,
the EU3 had conceded to unilaterally altering the
Paris Agreement into solely an instrument of de-facto
cessation of Iranian peaceful enrichment program, in
violation of the letter and spirit of that Agreement.

4.2. Iran’s Proposals

In February 2005, Iran suggested to the EU3 to ask the
IAEA to develop technical, legal and monitoring
modalities for Iran’s enrichment program as objective
guarantees to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program would
remain exclusively for peaceful purposes. While one
member of EU3 accepted the suggestion, unfortunately
the lack of consensus among the EU3 prevented resort
to the IAEA as an authoritative and impartial
framework for solving the impasse.

On March 23, 2005, in a clearly stated desire to
salvage the Paris Agreement, Iran offered a collection
of solutions for objective guarantees suggested by
various independent scientist and observers from the
United States and Europe. The package included:

1. Strong and mutually beneficial relations between
Iran and the EU/EU3, which would provide the best
guarantee for respect for the concerns of each side;

2. Confinement of Iran’s enrichment program, in order
to preclude through objective technical guarantees any
proliferation concern:

a. [missing point]

b. Open fuel cycle, to remove any concern about
reprocessing and production of plutonium;

c. Ceiling of enrichment at LEU level;

d. Limitation of the extent of the enrichment program

to solely meet the contingency fuel requirements of
Iran’s power reactors;

e. Immediate conversion of all enriched Uranium to
fuel rods to preclude even the technical possibility
of further enrichment; Incremental and phased approach
to implementation in order to begin with the least
sensitive aspects of the enrichment program and to
gradually move to enrichment as confidence in the
program would be enhanced;

3. Legislative and regulatory measures

a. [missing point]

b. Additional Protocol;

c. Permanent ban on the development, stockpiling and
use of nuclear weapons through binding national
legislation;

d. Enhancement of Iran’s export control regulations;

4. Enhanced monitoring

a. Continued implementation of the Additional
Protocol; and

b. Continuous on-site presence of IAEA inspectors at
the conversion and enrichment facilities to provide
unprecedented added guarantees.

4.2.1. EU3 Inability to React

Extraneous pressure had resulted in the absence of any
desire or ability by EU3 to even consider any
“objective guarantee” as called for in the Paris
Agreement and instead to maneuver to achieve a
de-facto cessation of Iran’s lawful activities. This
extraneous political element precluded even a serious
review by EU3 of these independently worked out
proposals, which continue to have the most credible
potential of providing a basis for allaying all
reasonable concerns.

Even Iran’s further good-faith effort on April 29,
2005 to salvage the process by suggesting the
negotiated resumption of the work of the UCF- which
had never had any past alleged failures, and is
virtually proliferation free - at low capacity and
with additional confidence building and surveillance
and monitoring measures was rejected outright by EU3
officials without even consideration at political
level.

4.2.2. Prelude to Breakdown in Nuclear Talks

Iran replied to such intransigence with self-restraint
to ensure that no opportunity was spared for an agreed
settlement. In a ministerial meeting in Geneva in May
2005, Iran agreed to extend the period of full
suspension for another two months, in response to a
commitment made by the EU3 ministers to finally
present their comprehensive package for the
implementation of the Paris Agreement by the end of
July or early August 2005, that is nearly nine months
after the Agreement.

Iran made it clear in Geneva that any proposal by the
EU3 must incorporate EU3’s perception of objective
guarantees for the gradual resumption of the Iranian
enrichment program, and that any attempt to turn
objective guarantees into cessation or long-term
suspension were incompatible with the letter and
spirit of the Paris Agreement and therefore
unacceptable to Iran.

4.2.3. A Further Compromise Suggested by Iran

Eager to salvage the negotiations, in a further
message to the Ministers, Iran offered the most
flexible solution to the EU3 as they were finalizing
their package:

Commencement of the work of Esfahan plant (UCF)

o At low capacity,

o Under full scope monitoring,

o Agreed arrangements for import of the feed material
and export of the product;
• Initial limited operation at Natanz following

o Further negotiations on a mutually acceptable
arrangement, or

o Allowing the IAEA to develop an optimized
arrangement on numbers, monitoring mechanism and other
specifics;

Full scale operation of Natanz:

o Based on a negotiated agreement;

o Synchronized with the fuel requirements of future
light water reactors.

4.3. EU’s Package: Too Many Demands, No Incentives

Against all its sincere efforts and maximum
flexibility, on 5 August 2005 Iran received a
disappointing proposal. It not only failed to address
Iran’s rights for peaceful development of nuclear
technology, but did not offer anything to Iran in
return. It even fell far short of correcting the
illegal and unjustified restrictions placed on Iran’s
economic and technological development, let alone
providing firm guarantees for economic, technological
and nuclear cooperation and firm commitments on
security issues. While Iran had made it crystal clear
that no incentive would be sufficient to compromise
Iran’s inalienable right to all aspects of peaceful
nuclear technology, the offers of incentives
incorporated in the proposal were in and of themselves
demeaning and totally incommensurate with Iran and its
vast capabilities, potentials and requirements.

4.3.1. Extra-Legal Demands of Binding Commitments from
Iran

The proposal self-righteously assumed rights and
licenses for the EU3 which clearly went beyond or even
contravened international law and assumed obligations
for Iran which have no place in law or practice. It
incorporated a series of one-sided and self serving
extra-legal demands from Iran, ranging from accepting
infringements on its sovereignty to relinquishing its
inalienable rights.

It sought to intimidate Iran to accept intrusive and
illegal inspections well beyond the Safeguards
Agreement or the Additional Protocol. It asked Iran to
abandon most of its peaceful nuclear program. It
further sought to establish a subjective,
discriminatory and arbitrary set of criteria for the
Iranian nuclear program, which would have effectively
dismantled most of Iran’s peaceful nuclear
infrastructure, criteria that if applied globally
would only monopolize the nuclear industry for the
Nuclear-Weapon States.

4.3.2. Vague, Conditional and Demeaning Offers to Iran

The proposal had absolutely no firm guarantees or
commitments and did not even incorporate meaningful or
serious offers of cooperation to Iran. It amounted to
an elongated but substantively shortened and
self-servingly revised version of an offer that had
been proposed by EU3 and rejected by Iran in October
2004 even prior to the Paris Agreement. This indicated
that there was no attempt on the part of EU3 to even
take into consideration the letter and spirit of the
Paris Agreement in their proposal.

This point is further illustrated by the fact that the
proposal never even mentioned the terms “objective
guarantees”, “firm guarantees” or “firm commitments”,
which were the foundations of the Paris Agreement.
Instead it tried to replace “objective guarantees”
with termination of Iran’s hard gained peaceful
nuclear program, and replace “firm guarantees and firm
commitments” with vague, conditional and partial
restatements of existing obligations.
In the area of security, the proposal did not go
beyond repeating UN Charter principles or
previously-made general commitments. Worse yet, the
proposal even attempted to make EU3’s commitment to
these general principles of international law
optional, partial, and conditional by prefacing the
segment with the following statement: “The EU3 propose
that, within the context of an overall agreement, this
section could include, inter alia, the following
mutual commitments in conformity with the Charter of
the United Nations.”

Another example is the negative security assurances
provided in the proposal by the nuclear-weapons states
of the EU3. The proposal offered the mere repetition -
only by UK and France — of a universal commitment
already made by all nuclear weapon states in 1995 to
all NPT members. It even made the application of that
commitment to Iran contingent on an overall agreement
by stating “Within the context of an overall agreement
and Iran’s fulfillment of its obligations under the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT), the United Kingdom and France would be prepared
to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances
given on 6 April 1995, and referred to in United
Nations Security Council Resolution 984 (1995).”

In the area of technology cooperation, it failed to
include even an indication - let alone guarantees —
of the EU3 readiness to abandon or ease its violations
of international law and the NPT with regard to Iran’s
access to technology. For instance, while under the
NPT, the EU3 is obliged to facilitate Iran’s access to
nuclear technology, the proposal makes a conditional
and ambiguous offer “not to impede participation in
open competitive tendering.” And far from the
generally advertised offer of EU cooperation with Iran
in construction of new nuclear power plants, the
proposal generously offered to “fully support
long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field
between Iran and Russia.”

In the area of economic cooperation, the proposal only
included a conditional recital of already existing
commitments and arrangements. While most of the
document amounted to general promises of future
considerations, even specific offers went no further
than conditional expressions of “readiness to
discuss.” Two examples may be sufficient in this
regard: “The EU3 would continue to promote the sale of
aircraft parts to Iran and be willing to enter into
discussion about open procurement of the sale of civil
passenger aircraft to Iran.” Or, “the EU3 and Iran, as
well as the Commission, would discuss possible future
oil and gas pipeline projects.”

This proposal made it self-evident that negotiations
were not “proceeding” as called for in the Paris
Agreement, due to EU3 policy of disregarding the
requirements of that Agreement, reverting to their
pre-Agreement positions, and prolonging a semblance of
negotiations without the slightest attempt to move
forward in fulfilling their commitments under the
Tehran or Paris Agreements. This protracted
continuation was solely designed to keep the
suspension in place for as long as it takes to make
“cessation” a fait accompli. This was contrary to the
letter and spirit of the Paris Agreement and was not
in line with principles of good faith negotiations.
In short, the proposal, read objectively in the
context of the negotiating history of the Paris
Agreement as well as its letter and spirit, clearly
illustrates the total abandonment of that Agreement by
the EU3, who have conveniently accused Iran of the
same.

4.3.3. Minimal Reaction from Iran

After such a long period of negotiations and all that
Iran had done and continues to do in order to restore
confidence as well as the flexibility that Iran has
shown, there was no pretext for any further delay in
the implementation of the first phase of Iran’s
proposal, by limited resumption of UCF at Isfahan,
which has been free from any past alleged failures,
and is virtually proliferation free. In this context,
Iran informed the Agency of its decision to resume the
uranium conversion activities at the UCF in Isfahan
and asked the Agency to be prepared for the
implementation of the Safeguards related activities in
a timely manner prior to the resumption of the UCF
activities.

4.4. Who Violated the Paris Agreement?

According to the Paris Agreement, “the suspension will
be sustained while negotiations proceed on a mutually
acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.” It
also envisaged a mechanism for assessment of progress
within three months. In the meeting of 23 March 2005,
it was clear that there had been no progress over the
preceding three months. As a clearly-stated attempt to
salvage the agreement, Iran made its March 23rd
proposal in terms of a package of objective
guarantees.

The refusal of the EU3 to even consider that package
coupled with their behavior in the course of the
negotiations, their August 2005 proposal and their
repeated statements during the time of the
presentation of that proposal and since then made in
abundantly clear that under pressure from the US
following the Paris Agreement, the EU3 had decided to
unilaterally change the nature of the Paris Agreement.
This amounted to a breach of the letter and spirit of
the Paris Agreement as well as the principle of
good-faith negotiations.

The EU3 negotiating posture and the empirical evidence
of lack of progress had in fact removed any onus from
Iran to continue the suspension. However, Iran decided
to maintain the suspension of all enrichment related
activities and resume only the UCF process, which is
by definition a pre-enrichment process. Therefore, the
assertion that Iran broke the Paris Agreement is a
self-serving and factually false proposition. In fact,
the reverse is the case.

5. Iran Goes the Extra Mile for a Negotiated Solution

The Islamic Republic of Iran has always wanted to
ensure that no effort is spared in order to reach a
negotiated resumption of its enrichment activities.
It, therefore, engaged in good faith and intensive
negotiations with the EU3 and other interested
delegations during the Summit of the United Nations in
September 2005 in order to remove obstacles to the
resumption of good-faith and result-oriented
negotiations in accordance with established rights and
obligations under the NPT. In this context, Iran
responded positively to a proposal which would have
removed any concern about the continued operation of
the UCF in Isfahan at lower capacity for a specific
period to allow negotiations to reach results. Iran
also agreed to resume negotiations with the EU3 and to
consider all proposals that had been presented.
Furthermore, the President of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, in his address to the General Assembly on
September 17, 2005, made yet another far reaching
offer of added guarantee by inviting international
partnership in Iran’s enrichment activities.
While the President reiterated that Iran’s right to
have fuel cycle technology was not negotiable, he
presented the following confidence-building positions
and proposals in his statement:

• Readiness for constructive interaction and a just
dialogue in good faith;

• Prohibition of pursuit of nuclear weapons in
accordance with religious principles;

• Necessity to revitalize the NPT;

• Cooperation with the IAEA as the centerpiece of
Iran’s nuclear policy;

• Readiness to continue negotiations with the EU3;

• Readiness to consider various proposals that have
been presented;
Welcome the proposal of South Africa to move the
process forward;

• Acceptance of partnership with private and public
sectors of other countries in the implementation of
uranium enrichment program in Iran which engages other
countries directly and removes any concerns.

6. Abuse of IAEA Machinery

Regrettably, the EU3, pressed by the United States,
adopted a path of confrontation in the September 2005
IAEA Board of Governors meeting. In clear violation of
their October 2003 and November 2004 commitments, the
EU3moved a politically motivated and factually and
legally flawed resolution in the IAEA Board of
Governors, and together with the United States and
using all their combined diplomatic and economic
leverages imposed it on the Board through an
unprecedented resort to voting rather than the
previously unbroken practice of consensus.

6.1. No Legal or Factual Grounds for IAEA “Findings”

The imposed resolution makes a mockery of the
proceedings of the Board of Governors by rehashing
alleged failures that had already been dealt with in
the November 2003 Board. At that time, despite the
existence of ambiguities and serious questions on
important issues such as the source of HEU
contamination, “findings” of “non-compliance” or
“absence of confidence” in the exclusively peaceful
nature of Iran’s program were impossible.
The Board refrained from making such findings in 2003
not because of a now-claimed “voluntary restraint” by
EU3, but because such were factually and legally
impossible due to the nature of failures - which were
solely of technical reporting character — and also
because of the fact that the Director-General had
specifically stated in his November 2003 report that
“to date, there is no evidence that the previously
undeclared nuclear material and activities referred to
above were related to a nuclear weapons program.” It
is ironic that after two years of cooperation, over
1200 person/days of intrusive inspections, resolution
of nearly all outstanding issues particularly the
foreign source of contamination, and after repeated
reiteration of the finding of non-diversion including
the conclusion in the IAEA November 2004 report that
“all the declared nuclear material in Iran has been
accounted for, and therefore such material is not
diverted to prohibited activities,” the imposed
resolution discovered ex post facto that the failures
“detailed in Gov/2003/75 [the aforementioned report of
November 2003] constitutes non-compliance.”

6.2. The Real Story: Pressure to Deny Iran’s
Inalienable Rights

While the resolution attempted to create a convenient
- albeit false - pretext of these alleged and old
reporting failures for its so-called “findings”, it is
abundantly clear that the reason for production of
this resolution was by no means those alleged
failures, but instead the resumption of Iran’s
perfectly legal and safeguarded activities in Isfahan.
In this context, it must be underlined that all States
party to the NPT, without discrimination, have an
inalienable right to produce nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. As this right is “inalienable”, it
cannot be undermined or curtailed under any pretext.
Any attempt to do so, would be an attempt to undermine
a pillar of the Treaty and indeed the Treaty itself.
Iran, like any other Non-Nuclear-Weapon State, had no
obligation to negotiate and seek agreement for the
exercise of its “inalienable” right, nor could it be
obligated to suspend it. Suspension of Uranium
enrichment, or any derivative of such suspension, is a
voluntary and temporary confidence-building measure,
effectuated by Iran in order to enhance cooperation
and close the chapter of denials of access to
technology imposed by the west on Iran. It is not an
end in itself, nor can it be construed or turned into
a permanent abandonment of a perfectly lawful
activity, thereby perpetuating, rather than easing,
the pattern of denial of access to technology.

The suspension of Uranium enrichment has been in place
for nearly two years, with all its economic and social
ramifications affecting thousands of families. The EU3
failed to remove any of the multifaceted restrictions
on Iran’s access to advanced and nuclear technology.
In a twist of logic, it even attempted to prolong the
suspension, thereby trying to effectively widen its
restrictions instead of fulfilling its commitments of
October 2003 and November 2004 to remove them.

As the IAEA Board of Governors had underlined in its
past and current resolution, suspension “is a
voluntary, non-legal binding confidence building
measure”. When the Board itself explicitly recognizes
that suspension is “not a legally-binding obligation”,
no wording by the Board can turn this voluntary
measure into an essential element for anything. In
fact the Board of Governors has no factual or legal
ground, nor any statutory power, to make or enforce
such a demand, or impose ramifications as a
consequence of it.

7. The Way Forward: No Coercion, Good-Faith
Negotiations

The recently imposed resolution on the IAEA Board of
Governors is devoid of any legal authority, and any
attempt to implement it will be counter-productive and
will leave Iran with no option but to suspend its
voluntary confidence building measures. The threat of
referral to the Security Council will only further
complicate the issue and will not alter Iran’s resolve
to exercise its legitimate and inalienable rights
under the NPT. At the same time, Iran is determined to
pursue good-faith interaction and negotiations, based
on equal footing, as the centerpiece of its approach
to the nuclear issue. A diplomatic and negotiated
framework is the desired approach for a successful
outcome and Iran is ready to consider all constructive
and effective proposals.Iran welcomes consultations
and negotiations with other countries in order to
facilitate the work of the Agency and calls on the EU3
to replace the course of confrontation with
interaction and negotiation to reach understanding and
agreement.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is committed to
non-proliferation and the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and considers nuclear weapons and capability
to produce or acquire them as detrimental to its
security. Iran will continue to abide by its
obligations under the NPT and will continue to work
actively for the establishment of a zone free from
weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East.


L'argent est le nerf de la paix ! ACDN vous remercie de lui faire un DON

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